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   NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 17-1684 
________________ 
 
HECTOR PONCE-VERDUZCO, 
            Petitioner 
  
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Respondent 
________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A088-188-397) 
Immigration Judge: Annie S. Garcy   
________________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
on October 3, 2017 
 
Before: SHWARTZ and ROTH, Circuit Judges and PAPPERT*, District Judge 
 
(Opinion filed: July 31, 2018) 
 
________________ 
 
  OPINION**  
________________ 
 
                                              
* The Honorable Gerald J. Pappert, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
** This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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ROTH, Circuit Judge 
 
Hector Ponce-Verduzco (Ponce) appeals the order of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (BIA) denying his motion to reopen his immigration proceedings.  Because we 
conclude that the BIA and Immigration Judge (IJ) did not abuse their discretion in 
concluding that Ponce’s former counsel was not ineffective, we will deny the petition for 
review. 
I.  
Ponce, a citizen of Mexico and former Mexican police officer, entered the United 
States in the late 1980s without being admitted or paroled.  In January 2009, the 
Department of Homeland Security commenced removal proceedings against Ponce.  
Ponce filed a Form I-589 Application for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal on the 
ground that he would suffer retaliation if deported to Mexico for previously exposing a 
fellow police officer’s illegal acts there.  But when Ponce went before an IJ for his 
individual hearing in 2013, he did not proceed with his asylum application and instead 
accepted a grant of voluntary departure.   
Later, in 2014, Ponce—now represented by a new attorney—filed a motion and 
supporting certification to reopen his removal proceedings for consideration of a 
separately-filed I-589, this one based on his fear of persecution in Mexico due to his 
perceived wealth.  Ponce argued that his prominence in the Mexican American 
community, as well as the increased occurrence of kidnappings of Mexican Americans in 
Mexico, constituted material changes that warranted reopening his removal proceeding.   
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In the motion, Ponce also alleged that his former counsel provided ineffective 
assistance.  According to Ponce, before his scheduled individual hearing with the IJ, he 
informed his former counsel that he wanted to file a new asylum application relating to 
his fear of being kidnapped in Mexico due to his perceived wealth.  Ponce claims that his 
former counsel improperly advised him that he could not raise a new basis for asylum at 
his individual hearing and that he should instead agree to voluntary departure.  Ponce 
accepted this advice and agreed to voluntary departure.   
Prior to filing his motion to reopen, Ponce personally delivered a letter to his 
former counsel in which he stated that he considered her advice to be wrong and that he 
would be retaining a new attorney.  Ponce never submitted a grievance against his former 
counsel with disciplinary authorities, believing that she mistakenly provided deficient 
advice, but had not engaged in unethical conduct.   
On November 30, 2014, a different IJ denied the motion to reopen.  The IJ 
concluded that Ponce had not provided evidence that country conditions had changed 
after his original hearing and he therefore failed to raise new evidence warranting 
reopening.1  The IJ also rejected Ponce’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, 
concluding that Ponce’s sworn testimony indicated that he did not have a fear of 
returning to Mexico and “that he well-understood that he had withdrawn his I-589 and 
decided to agree to accept voluntary departure . . . and that it was his decision to do so.”2   
                                              
1 Ponce does not challenge this aspect of the IJ’s ruling. 
2 A.R. 36, 38-39.   
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On February 27, 2017, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s denial of Ponce’s motion to 
reopen.  As an additional ground for denying Ponce’s motion, the BIA added that Ponce 
failed to satisfy the procedural requirements mandated by the BIA in Matter of Lozada.3  
This appeal followed. 
II. 
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).  “When, 
as here, the BIA affirms an IJ’s decision and adds analysis of its own, we review both the 
IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions.”4   
We review the denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion and may 
reverse only where the denial is “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.”5  We review 
findings of fact related to the motion for substantial evidence.6  Under this standard, the 
findings are “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to 
conclude to the contrary.”7   
                                              
3 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988).  Those requirements are that the alien “(1) support the 
claim with an affidavit attesting to the relevant facts; (2) inform former counsel of the 
allegations and provide counsel with the opportunity to respond (this response should be 
submitted with the alien’s pleading asserting ineffective assistance); and (3) state 
‘whether a complaint has been filed with appropriate disciplinary authorities regarding 
[the allegedly deficient] representation, and if not, why not.’”  Fadiga v. Att’y Gen., 488 
F.3d 142, 155 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 639). 
4 Contreras v. Att’y Gen., 665 F.3d 578, 583 (3d Cir. 2012). 
5 Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 174 (3d Cir. 2002). 
6 Filja v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241, 251 (3d Cir. 2006). 
7 Borges v. Gonzales, 402 F.3d 398, 404 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 
1252(b)(4)(B)). 
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An alien seeking to reopen an immigration proceeding on the basis of ineffective 
assistance of counsel must demonstrate that (1) “competent counsel would have acted 
otherwise”; and (2) counsel’s poor performance resulted in prejudice.8   
The record supports the conclusion that Ponce’s counsel’s performance was not 
deficient.  According to Ponce, his counsel advised him against filing a new form I-589 
and instead advised him to agree to voluntary departure.  We find no support in Ponce’s 
argument that a competent attorney would have acted otherwise, especially given the fact 
that Ponce had previously filed a conflicting I-589 indicating that he feared going back to 
Mexico for different reasons.  Moreover, the IJ found that Ponce’s sworn testimony 
indicated that he did not fear returning to Mexico and that he accepted voluntary 
departure on his own accord.  Because we accept these findings, we see no reason to 
disturb the IJ’s or BIA’s rulings.9  
III. 
For the foregoing reasons, we deny Ponce’s petition for review.   
                                              
8 Fadiga, 488 F.3d at 157 (citation omitted). 
9 We need not reach the issue of whether Ponce met the procedural requirements set out 
in Lozada. 
